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Constitutional Barriers to Smooth Sailing:

14 U.S.C. § 89(a) and the Fourth
Amendment
MEGAN JAYE KIGHT'

INTRODUCTION
Bill Boiling had the first in a series of unfriendly encounters with the United
States Coast Guard on June 4, 1987. The Coast Guard cutter Ute approached the
Albert, the Bollings' home on the sea, and requested the name and description of
the vessel, which Boiling provided. Boiling continued his journey and
subsequently anchored in Charleston, South Carolina where two customs agents
approached and boarded the Bollings' vessel. The duo rummaged through the
family's clothing and possessions as they searched the vessel. When Bill
Bolling's son appeared, he was asked about a past drug conviction in New York.
The officers realized their error only when Bill, Jr., assured them that he had

never lived in New York. The Coast Guard apparently had the wrong Billy

Boiling.
The Bollings' second encounter with the Coast Guard on July 17 produced
only minor agitation. It was during the third encounter in September that the
Coast Guard boarded the Albert three times in one night. A single officer tried
to board initially, and when refused, the officer secured more men to help

facilitate the "safety inspection." Upon their return, they searched for about
twenty minutes, found nothing and departed. At 3:00 a.m. the Bollings awoke to
the sound of yet another boarding party, this one consisting of nine men and one
drug-sniffing dog. Three hours later, the Coast Guard left having discovered no

safety violations in the Bollings' drawers or beds.
The above account is interesting for two reasons: it is true,' and at the present

time, it appears to be legal. Two statutes, 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)2 and 19 U.S.C. §

* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. 1994,
DePauw University. I wish to express my appreciation to the United States Coast Guard for
stopping me and my family in the middle of the night in order to search our vessel and sparking
my interest in the subject of this Note. I also wish to thank my parents for introducing me to
the sea and my husband for his unwavering support and encouragement.
1.See Roger Vaughan, Showdown at Cape Fear,WASHINGTON POST MAG., Jan. 11, 1987,
at 3-15; Patty Whittell, Bill Boiling. Boarded,Bothered and Busted, MOTOR BOATING &
SAILING, Feb. 1987, at 66-69, 134-42.
2. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1994) authorizes the Coast Guard to:
make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the
high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the
prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States.
For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any time go
on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law,
of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's
documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all
necessary force to compel compliance.
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1581(a),3 vest the United States Coast Guard and customs officers 4 with virtually
unlimited authority to stop, board, and search vessels on the high seas5 and
within the customs waters6 without any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing,
much less a warrant. As such, these provisions comprise what has been
accurately characterized as "one of the most sweeping grants of police authority
ever to be written into U.S. law."7
Although the statute places no patent limitations on the Coast Guard's
authority, courts have generally interpreted the broad language to confine the
Coast Guard's authority to authorize searches for the purpose of conducting
safety and documentation inspections.8 The Coast Guard exercises these powers
often and aggressively, as part of a devoted effort to reduce the flow of drugs
into the United States. It has been estimated that at times as much as twenty-five
percent of the Coast Guard's entire operations is directed to drug interdiction.9
According to one Coast Guard Boarding Officer, in "[e]very boarding the Coast
Guard conducts they are looking for drugs, as a rule, no matter where the vessel
is or its activity."' Some of the Coast Guard's interdiction programs have
received criticism due to their waste of precious resources and misplaced
motives." This criticism is magnified by the reality that during a period of

3. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994) provides:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any
place in the United States or within the customs waters ...

within a customs-

enforcement area... or at any other authorized place... and examine the manifest
and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or
vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and
to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to
compel compliance.
4. Commissioned, warrant, and petty officers of the Coast Guard are also deemed to be
officers of the customs under 14 U.S.C. § 143 (1994).
5. The nautical delineation "high seas" refers to the area beyond the three mile territorial
sea, which extends from the coastline, and the contiguous zone, which extends from three to
twelve miles from the coast. James S. Carmichael, Comment, At Sea with the Fourth
Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 56 (1977); see also United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d
1058, 1064 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,446 U.S. 956 (1980).
6. "19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (1976) defines 'customs waters' as extending four leagues (about
[twelve] nautical miles) from the coast." Wallace R. Young, Jr., CriminalProcedure-Vessels
in Inland Waters Are Subject to Suspicionless Boarding-United States v. VillamonteMarquez, 6 CAMPBELL L. REv. 183, 183 (1984).
7. S.EVANS, THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 1790-1915, at 218 (1949).

8. See, e.g., Cilley v. United States, 785 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Shelnut, 625 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1980); Warren, 578 F.2d at 1065; United States v.
Hillstrom, 533 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United
States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hilton, 469 F. Supp. 94,
107 (N.D. Me. 1979).
9. Peter A. Janssen, At the Helm: Boardingwith Dignity, MOTOR BOATING & SAILING,
May 1987, at I (statement of Rear Admiral Paul A. Yost, commandant of the Coast Guard).
10. JOE MEEK, BOARDED!: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE COAST GUARD BOARDING 9
(1991).
11. For example, the "Zero Tolerance" program was implemented in 1988 and was
designed to decrease demand for illicit drugs by concentrating on drug users. It authorized
seizure of a vessel on which any detectable amount of drugs was found. After overwhelming
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particularly aggressive enforcement, in only one percent or less of the boardings
conducted by the Coast Guard was a drug violation discovered. 2 As the Coast
Guard uses more intrusive methods, causing law-abiding boat owners to suffer,
public resistance to these antics grows. This discontent has produced ardent
constitutional protests to such police authority based primarily on the Fourth
Amendment 3 which protects citizens from "arbitrary and oppressive interference
by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals."' 4
The purpose of this Note is to examine and analyze the judicial treatment of the
power vested in the Coast Guard, and to consider the constitutional challenges
that have been advanced. Part I of this Note will offer a brief overview of the
history of the statutory evolution of 14 U.S.C. § 89.'" Part II will examine and
analyze the judicial treatment of the law by focusing on common problems and
issues addressed by the courts. Part III will offer alternatives which coincide with
the traditional interpretation and treatment of the Fourth Amendment.
I. STATUTORY EVOLUTION

The foundations for this contemporary constitutional battle were laid on July
31, 1789. In an act regulating the collection of duties on the tonnage of vessels
and on the importation of merchandise, the First Congress provided:
That every collector, naval officer, and surveyor... shall have full power and
authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they have reason to suspect
any goods, wares, or merchandise, subject to duty, shall be concealed; and
therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods ... .

resistance to this measure surfaced, Congress evaluated the program. Shortly thereafter, the
Coast Guard rescinded the program. See Greg Shelton, The United States Coast Guard
Authority's Law Enforcement Under 14 U.S.C. § 89: Smugglers' Blues or Boaters'
Nightmare?, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 979-80 (1993).
12. See Janssen, supranote 9.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § I provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
14. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); see also United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
15. This Note will focus primarily on the Coast Guard's authority to board and search
vessels beyond the territorial sea under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), as opposed to the authority of
customs officers to search vessels in the United States customs waters under 19 U.S.C. §
1581(a). However, the issues which arise under these parallel statutes are often synonymous.
Thus, there will be some overlap.
16. Act of July, 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43, repealedby Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch.
35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178.
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This Act was repealed by the Act of August 4, 179017 which enlarged the prior
regulations and created the Revenue Cutter Service. 8 Section'31 of the Act
provided:
That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspectors,
and the officers of the revenue cutters... to go on board of ships or vessels
in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof,
if bound to the United States... for the purposes of demanding the manifests
aforesaid, and of examining and searching the said ships or vessels; and the
said officers respectively shall have free access to the cabin, and every other
part of a ship or vessel ....

9

This Act remained substantially unchanged 0 until the Act of July 18, 1866 which
provided:
That it shall be lawful for any officer of the customs.., or of a revenue cutter
...to go on board of any vessel ...and to inspect, search, and examine the
same, and any person, trunk, or envelope on board . .. and to use all

necessary force to compel compliance ....
"
This provision should be closely compared with section three of the Act of July
18, 1866, which governs the authority of the same officials to search "vehicle[s],
beast[s], or person[s]," presumably referring to the counterparts of vessels
located on land.2 The two sections of the Act of July 18, 1866, are largely
identical except that section three incorporates an additional provision which
confines the officers' authority to search exclusively where they have
"reasonable cause" to believe there is a violation of law.23 Thus, the section
dealing with the authority to search vessels at sea expressly permitted searches
based on no particularized suspicion. Additionally, in the predecessors to this
Act the authority to board and search was limited by the language "in any part of
the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the
United States."24 However, the words expressing this restriction were omitted in
the Act of July 18, 1866.25

17. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, repealedby Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, §
2, 14 Stat. 178.
18. § 62, 1 Stat. at 175.
19. § 31, 1 Stat. at 164.
20. In fact, the provision in § 31 of the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 164, was
preserved in the Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 70, 1 Stat. 627, 678. The latter is now § 3072
of the Revised Statutes and provides:
It shall be the duty of the several officers of the customs to seize and secure any
vessel or merchandise which shall become liable to seizure by virtue of any law
respecting the revenue, as well without as within their respective districts.
Title 34, ch. 10, § 3072, Revised Statutes of the United States 590 (1878).
21. Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 2, 14 Stat. 178, repealedby Act of June 22, 1936, ch.
705, 49 Stat. 1820 (codified as amended at 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1994)).
22. Id.
23. Jd.

24. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164 (repealed 1866).
25. This provision was also reenacted in the Revised Statutes. Title 34, ch. 10, § 3059,
Revised Statutes 588 (1878). The significance of the omission in this provision is ambiguous,
as another section of the same title, which also dealt with the boarding and searching of vessels,
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Congress created the United States Coast Guard as it exists today in 1915 when
it combined the existing Life-Saving Service with the Revenue Cutter Service to
form the new agency.26 This Act had no practical effect on the law enforcement
power of the agency, as the Act expressly continued the applicability of
preexisting statutes and directed that "[a]ll duties now performed by the
Revenue-Cutter Service and Life-Saving Service shall continue to be performed
, 27
by the Coast Guard ....
In 1936, Congress enacted the foundations for 14 U.S.C. § 89 to clearly define
the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard28 by "remov[ing] all possible doubt"
regarding the scope of the jurisdiction.2 9 The Act of June 22, 1936, was enacted
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Maul v. United States3" and
contained the provisions of 14 U.S.C. § 89 as they currently exist.3'
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT AND ANALYSIS

Courts which have approached the Coast Guard's authority to board and search
granted by 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) have often refrained from employing traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis. Courts have hastily declared the statute
constitutional, and in doing so, have commonly cited United States v. One 43
Foot Sailing Vessel,32 a Fifth Circuit per curiam opinion of only one paragraph,
in which the court was content to simply state that the statute is constitutional

retained the restrictive language, except for the substitution of the word "port" for "part." Title
34, ch. 10, § 3067, Revised Statutes of the United States 589 (1878).
26. Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 20, 38 Stat. 800 (codified as amended at 14 U.S.C. § 1
(1994)).
27. 1d. at 801.
28. Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 705, 49 Stat. 1820 (codified as amended at 14 U.S.C. § 89
(1994)).
29. H.R. REP. No. 2452, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936).
30. 274 U.S. 501 (1927). Maul involved the forfeiture of the vessel Underwriterfor
violation of §§ 4377 and 4337 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in that the vessel
was employed in a trade other than that for which she was licensed, and she was on a foreign
voyage and was not properly registered. The District Court dismissed the action, holding that
the Coast Guard lacked authority to seize the vessel on the high seas. The Underwriter, 6 F.2d
937 (D. Conn. 1925). The Second Circuit reversed and sustained the two causes of action. The
Underwriter, 13 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1926), affd sub nom. Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501
(1927). The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard was not restricted to
the territorial waters of the United States or the contiguous zone (12 miles). Maul, 274 U.S. at
511. In the House Report on the bill which would eventually become 14 U.S.C. § 89, it was
cautioned that "based upon some expressions in the majority opinion, the contention will be
made that express authority of law is necessary to secure enforcement by the Coast Guard of
some laws and also to give jurisdiction to enforce those laws beyond the 12-mile limit." H.R.
REP. No. 2452, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
31. See supranote 2.
32. 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (holding that 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) is
constitutional).
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without confronting any of the possible constitutional problems. 33 This treatment
is typical of the courts' approach to the constitutionality of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).
The courts have, at best, superficially applied the Fourth Amendment in
upholding "boarding[s] that would be unconstitutional under any reasonableness
34
standard.
A. The HistoricalArgumentfor Consitutionality
In 1789 the First Congress, which promulgated the Bill of Rights, also
established the foundation for 14 U.S.C. § 89(a). The courts of several circuits
have used this "impressive historical pedigree, 35 to demonstrate the statute's
validity and its resilience to Fourth Amendment challenges. For example, in
UnitedStates v. Williams 36 the Fifth Circuit noted that section 24 of the Act of
July 31, 1789, "granted customs officials 'full power and authority' to enter and
search 'any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods,
wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed ....
The court
emphasized that this acknowledgment of plenary customs power was broad in
comparison to the more limited authority to enter and search "'any particular
dwelling-house, store, building, or other place...' where a warrant upon 'cause
to suspect' was required.",3' Thus, the court concluded that the 1789 customs
statute reflected the opinion of the First Congress that the Fourth Amendment did
not prohibit warrantless searches based upon no suspicion of criminal activity.
The Ninth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Watson, 39 emphasizing that
the involvement of the First Congress in the enactment of the predecessor to the
current statute demonstrates that these searches are not "unreasonable" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
The Supreme Court of the United States similarly relied on this argument in
UnitedStates v. Villamonte-Marquez.4 The Court noted that "it is clear that the
",,'

33. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); cf.United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 946-47
(5th Cir. 1978) (comparing 19 U.S.C. § 1581).
34. Howard S. Marks, The FourthAmendment: Rusting on the High Seas?, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 1537, 1560 (1983).
35. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585 (1983).
36. 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
37. Id. at 1079 (quoting the Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43).
38. Id.
39. 678 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1982).
40. Id.
41. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). It is important to note that Villamonte-Marquez does not provide
controlling precedent for cases arising under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) because its holding was limited
to approval of a suspicionless boarding of a vessel in the territorial waters of the United States
by customs officers. Villamonte-Marquez was decided under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). To
understand why this Note does not take issue with 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), see supra note 15.
The only treatment of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) by the Supreme Court has been in the context of
illustrating the jurisdiction of the United States upon the high seas. See EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991) (citing 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) as one of the numerous occasions
on which Congress has expressly legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute);
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members of [the First Congress] did not regard searches and seizures of this kind
as 'unreasonable,' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the
amendment."42
The court in Williams acknowledged that "[a]lthough the First Congress's
construction of the fourth amendment is entitled to great weight, it does not
necessarily settle the question of what is 'reasonable' within the meaning of the
fourth amendment today." ' 3 It is clear that the First Congress thought various
practices were "reasonable" that would be abhorrent to contemporary American
society, such as slavery and refusing women the right to vote. Fundamental to our
democracy is the notion that "no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the
Constitution."" It follows that because the Constitution is not static, but changes
with contemporary notions of justice, reliance upon the First Congress's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is misplaced and insufficient. A statute
must be "reasonable" under a modem interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Even courts which have offered this historical analysis have acknowledged that
times have changed since the days of the First Congress. For example, in
Williams the court stated that "[tjhe undoubted constitutionality of customs
searches and administrative inspections in the absence of suspicion of criminal
activity does not mean that the Coast Guard's power to search nautical vessels
is today as unrestricted as when [Chief Justice] Marshall decided [Church v.
Hubbart].4
The high seas themselves have also changed considerably since 1789:
The character of nautical activities has changed substantially since Chief
Justice Marshall's day. At the end of the eighteenth century almost all the
vessels on the seas were either warships or cargo vessels that would be tiny
by modem standards. Presently, however, the seas are teeming with pleasure
vessels, [and] ocean liners that carry passengers and little cargo .... 46
Thus, the idea that a vessel might be a "dwelling-house" was foreign to the
members of the First Congress, which may explain part of its willingness to
authorize warrantless searches of vessels based upon no suspicion of
wrongdoing. Perhaps if pleasure vessels had been more prevalent, the distinction
between the two sections of the Act of 1789 previously mentioned, one requiring
no suspicion and the other requiring a warrant based on probable cause, would
not be as clear. Additionally, modem technology has simplified the duties of the
Coast Guard and customs officers. For example, the Coast Guard is able to
contact vessels and acquire information about the home port of the vessel, its
intended destination, its purpose, and the number and identification of those

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989) (citing 14
U.S.C. § 89(a) as an example of action by Congress which placed the high seas within the
jurisdictional reach of a statute).
42. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 587 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
623 (1886)).
43. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1081 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane); see also
United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 419 n.8 (2d Cir. 1981).
44. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
45. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1086.
46. Id. at 1085.
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aboard through the use of a radio. It may then check this information against that
which it has conveniently stored in a computer on shore by using a ship-to-shore
radio. As the Second Circuit acknowledged, these factors necessitate that the
courts "interpret the Fourth Amendment in the light of contemporary notions of
privacy as well as contemporary technology.' t 7
There is evidence that the enactments of the First Congress do not reflect an
intention to authorize warrantless searches of vessels on the high seas based
upon no particularized suspicion. The Act of July 31, 1789, authorized searches
of vessels by customs officers only when they had "reason to suspect" that goods
subject to duty were concealed aboard the vessel.4" Furthermore, the statute was
facially confined to searches within the 12-mile limit, and thus, withheld
authorization for such searches upon the high seas. The Act of August 4, 1790,
permitted searches "in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the
coast thereof,"' 9 excluding any waters beyond the 12-mile limit. Therefore, the
intention of the First Congress was to give customs agents the power to search
vessels in or near American ports only."
Similar reasoning has been used in other instances, yet failed to carry the day.
For example, the dissenters in Almeida-Sanchez, led by Justice White and joined
by three others, vehemently argued that in the enforcement of immigration laws
Congress had long considered vehicle searches at a reasonable distance from
international frontiers constitutionally permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.5 Although in Almeida-Sanchez the earlier authorizations were not
promulgated by the creators of the Fourth Amendment, it illustrates that a long
history of congressional approval does not necessarily establish per se
constitutionality.
B. The Reasonableness Calculus
The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of
"reasonableness" upon the exercise of discretion by government officials.52 It is
fundamental that searches conducted without a warrant based upon probable
cause are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few
"specifically established and well-delineated" exceptions.53 The Supreme Court
has stated that "the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests

47. Streifel, 665 F.2d at 419 n.8.
48. Ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. at 43.
49. Ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. at 164.
50. See Streifel, 665 F.2d at 419 n.8.
51. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 292 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
52. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 315-16 (1978); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967);
United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 360 (1979).
53. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Streifel, 665 F.2d at 419-20.
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against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."54 The courts have
borrowed heavily from the cases involving searches of automobiles, and by
comparison have concluded that the government has a greater interest at sea than
on the roads, and that the sailor has a lower expectation of privacy than the
driver. Some courts have completely rejected the applicability of the land-based
precedent due to the unique circumstances at sea." 5 Most courts have, however,
usually engaged in at least a cursory examination of the balancing test mandated
by the Fourth Amendment, and resolved the conflict in favor of the government.
Although some "quantum of individualized suspicion" is usually a prerequisite
to a constitutional search,56 the Fourth Amendment imposes no "irreducible
requirement of such suspicion.""7 Where less than individualized suspicion is
required, other safeguards are generally established.58 Thus, the courts have
stated that the reasonableness standard requires that the facts upon which an
intrusion is based be capable of measurement against an "objective standard,"59
which entails an examination of the nature and extent of the governmental
interest involved. In the seminal case justifying searches based upon less than
probable cause, the Supreme Court stated:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the
laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who
must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of
the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative
that the facts be judged against an objective standard ....Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has
consistently refused to sanction.6"
Thus, in order for police conduct to be reasonable, it "must pass muster under
objective standards applied to specific facts."'"
Courts have traditionally described the legitimate governmental interest
involved as securing compliance with safety and documentation regulations upon
the high seas.62 The "important factual differences" existing at sea in comparison
to analogous areas have led the courts to conclude that the governmental interest
is greater at sea than in similar situations on land. In Williams, which involved
the seizure of a Panamanian vessel in international waters about one hundred

54. Prouse,440 U.S. at 654; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555
(1976); Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 878; Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22; Camara,387 U.S. at 533.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Shelnut, 625 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 983 (1981); United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 133 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,449 U.S.
887 (1980); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1081 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
56. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 560 (1976); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 & n.18.
57. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 561.
58. Prouse,440 U.S. at 654-55.
59. Id. at 654; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
60. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
61. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 569.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 589-91 (1983); United
States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 361 (1979).
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miles east of the tip of the Yucatan Peninsula,6' the court examined these factual
differences and noted that "[t]here is a substantial distinction between a landlocked vehicle and a nautical vessel for Fourth Amendment purposes."'" The
court emphasized the relative difficulty of policing the nautical frontiers when
compared to policing the territorial boundaries of land 6' and stated that "the
extensive federal and international regulation of shipping and boating
significantly limits the privacy that anyone might expect to have on the seas. 66
The court cited the observations of one commentator that "[u]nlike a land bound
citizen in constant contact with the government and police, the mobility and
anonymity of persons aboard vessels at sea require that the government be able
to exercise effective control when an opportunity is presented., 67 The court held
that the search satisfied the Fourth Amendment, however, it did so on the basis
that the Coast Guard had reasonable suspicion. 68 The Williams court did not,
however, determine whether reasonable suspicion was the minimum standard for
searches of vessels on the high seas.69
The Fifth Circuit reiterated this logic in United States v. Shelnut, which
featured the boarding of a United States vessel in international waters one
hundred and eighty miles south of the mouth of the Mississippi River.7" After
stating that two recent Supreme Court cases, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.71 and

63. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1070 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). In United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply
to a search in Mexico by American authorities of the residence of a Mexican citizen. 494 U.S.
259 (1990). The soundness of this opinion is tenuous, as evidenced by the four separate
opinions filed, due to the irony of requiring "foreign nationals to abide by [United States law]
even when in their own countries, [yet] our Government need not abide by the Fourth
Amendment when it investigates them for violations of our laws." Id. at 279 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). As the Brennan dissent points out, this ignores the notion of mutuality which
ensures the "fundamental fairness that underlies our Bill of Rights." Id. at 284 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). However, the constitutional inadequacies of denying nonresidents the protections
of the Fourth Amendment in foreign lands is a subject which could comprise an entirely
separate note, and will not be treated fully herein. The holding of Verdugo-Urquidez appeared
to apply only to searches of nonresident aliens in foreign countries. However, the reasoning
was explicitly adopted in the context of searches at sea in UnitedStates v. Davis, which held
that the Fourth Amendment guarantees did not extend to a search of a foreign registry vessel
on the high seas. 905 F.2d 245, 251 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, the Fourth Amendment would
no longer apply to the search of the foreign registry vessel in Williams; however, the Fifth
Circuit's application of the reasonableness calculus remains pertinent.
64. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1081 (quoting United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 946 (5th
Cir. 1978)).

65. Id.
66. Id. at 1087.
67. Id. (quoting Carmichael, supra note 5, at 100).
68. Id.
at 1084 (stating that the court was not considering what minimal degree of suspicion
is required).
69. Id.
70. 625 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (holding that a warrantless administrative search is prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment).
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Delawarev. Prouse,72 which restricted the permissibility of warrantless searches
based upon no suspicion, were not applicable to the circumstances before them,
the Shelnut court reaffirmed its position that searches of the high seas are
"fundamentally different" from those on land.73 However, the court did not
explore the reasonableness calculus any further. It held that the searches were
based upon probable cause and were thus constitutional, as 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)
requires no suspicion of wrongdoing.74
The First Circuit employed similar reasoning in United States v. Burke, in
which the Coast Guard boarded an American ship in the Anegada Passage which
separates the Virgin Islands from the Leeward Islands.7" The court held that the
Coast Guard boarded the vessel upon reasonable suspicion, which ripened into
probable cause justifying a full search, thus precluding discussion of the fact that
14 U.S.C. § 89(a) requires no suspicion of criminal activity to board.76 In
reaching this conclusion, the First Circuit did apply the reasonableness calculus,
which as in Williams, weighed in the government's favor. The Burke court used
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, in which the Supreme Court declared that
random roving patrol stops by the Border Patrol to monitor illegal immigrants are
constitutionally prohibited,77 as its principal source of comparison. In doing so,
the court concluded that the "factual differences between vessels located in
waters offering ready access to the open sea and automobiles on principal
thoroughfares in the border area" justified a different conclusion from that which
the Supreme Court reached in Brignoni-Ponce.78 The court emphasized the
impracticality of conducting permanent checkpoint stops on the high seas where
vessels are able to maneuver "in any direction at any time and need not follow
established 'avenues' as automobiles must do.",79 Thus, for the Burke court, as
for the Williams court, the unique problems of policing the seas justified a less
restrictive standard, and the absence of less intrusive alternatives supported
search tactics requiring no "quantum of individualized suspicion.' ' "
In the three cases discussed above the courts avoided considering that 14
U.S.C. § 89 requires no suspicion of criminal activity by determining that the
Coast Guard had either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to search. The
courts' ability to find that the Coast Guard had reasonable suspicion heightened
the government's interest in securing compliance with safety laws, which
certainly affected the application of the reasonableness test. This observation is
not meant to suggest that the courts fabricated reasonable suspicion for the Coast
Guard where the conclusion was not warranted. It is only meant to illustrate that

72. 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (prohibiting random stops of automobiles where not based upon
suspicion of criminal activity or conducted within administrative guidelines).
73. Shelnut, 625 F.2d at 61.
74. Id.
75. 716 F.2d 935, 936 (1st Cir. 1983).
76. Id. at 93 8-3 9.
77. 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975).
78. Burke, 716 F.2d at 938 (quoting United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579,
588 (1983)).
79. Id.
80. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).
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many courts are able to avoid discussing that the statute requires no suspicion of
wrongdoing because the Coast Guard had reasonable suspicion or probable cause
in the particular cases before them.
The uniformity with which the previous decisions determined that the
reasonableness calculus weighed in favor of the government is not representative
of all cases in which the balancing test has been applied. The Supreme Court
offered a novel approach in Delaware v. Prouse,1 which did not concern
searches at sea, but examined the constitutionality of random stops of
automobiles to monitor compliance with licensing and registration regulations.
The Court furthered the notion that the reasonableness of police conduct should
be evaluated under both objective and subjective standards, which it had adopted
82
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.
This entails an examination of the
intrusion upon the individual's Fourth Amendment interests in terms of the
"objective intrusion-the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection
...[and] the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on
the part of lawful travels." 3 Additionally, the governmental interest is to be
evaluated in light of the "alternative mechanisms available, both those in use and
those that might be adopted," to achieve the government's objectives.84 The
Court, after concluding that these stops are not less intrusive than the roving
85
stops held impermissible in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
evaluated the
weight of the governmental interest in promoting public safety on the roads in
comparison to the individual's privacy interest. The Court conceded that the
government has "a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are
permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation,
and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are
being observed." 86 However, the Court concluded that the governmental interest
was not sufficient to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests. The
Court's conclusion focused on the costs associated with conducting random
searches in order to find improperly licensed drivers. The Court reasoned that
many violations of safety laws are observable due to requirements that vehicles
carry valid license plates, submit to annual safety inspections, and comply with
minimum insurance requirements. 7 Ultimately, the Court determined that:
The marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from a system
of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on
the roads to a seizure-limited in magnitude compared to other intrusions but
nonetheless constitutionally cognizable-at the unbridled discretion of law
enforcement officials. To insist neither upon an appropriate factual basis for
suspicion directed at a particular automobile nor upon some other substantial
and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of discretion "would

81. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
82. Id. at 656 (citing Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 558).
83. Id.
(quoting Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 558).
84. Id. at 659.
85. 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975).
86. Prouse,440 U.S. at 658.
87. Id. at 660.
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invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based upon nothing
more substantial than inarticulate hunches .... ."8&

Thus, the Court's resolution of the reasonableness test in favor of the individual
was largely due to the "'grave danger' of abuse of discretion"89 by the police in
conducting the random searches. Although the Court did not consider the
analogous searches at sea authorized under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), the comparison is
manifest and demands consideration.
The government has a legitimate interest in wishing to ensure that vessels on
the high seas are in compliance with the many safety and documentation
regulations, as did the law enforcement officers in Prouse. However, the
intrusion visited upon drivers of motor vehicles pales in comparison to the
intrusion to which those aboard vessels on the high seas are subjected. Instead
of being stopped along a public highway, on which there are bound to be other
travelers, a seafarer may be visited by the Coast Guard in the open waters where
he may not even see another traveler for days at a time. Additionally, the
customary practice for police officers in pulling over a vehicle is to activate their
lights to identify themselves as law enforcement officials. However, it is not
unusual for the Coast Guard to approach vessels in the middle of the night
without identifying themselves until they are within a few hundred yards of the
vessel, leaving those aboard wondering whether they are about to be overtaken
by drug pirates or the like. Furthermore, under normal circumstances, the police
officer does not climb into a vehicle with the passenger, even at checkpoint stops
which have been held constitutional.9" This, of course, is not the case in searches
at sea, where the Coast Guard may board the vessel, and search until they locate
all safety equipment, which may involve searching the hold for the main beam
number, the engine, the closed compartments, and the bilges.? Thus, the
intrusion resulting from vessel searches, both the objective stop itself and the
subjective amount of fright generated, is far greater than that involved in any
automobile search. This fact clearly weighs against the government in the
reasonableness calculus.
In Prouse,the Court found that random searches were unreasonable because
the officers had unfettered discretion in deciding which vehicles to search.92
Under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) the officers of the Coast Guard may board any vessel
at any time and in any place, as long as that vessel is subject to the laws of the
United States, without any limitation upon their discretion to choose which
vessels to board, or how frequently they might board one particular vessel.93
Thus, the officers' discretion at sea could not possibly be any more unlimited.
Under the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Prouse, this too would seem
to weigh against the government in the reasonableness calculus.

88. Id. at 661 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)) (omission in original).
89. Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976)).
90. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 566.
91. United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 359 (9th Cir. 1979).
92. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-62 (1979).
93. United States v. Willis, 639 F.2d 1335, 1337 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that "the statutes
authorizing such inspections place no limits on their frequency").
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In UnitedStates v. Piner, the Ninth Circuit narrowly held "that the random
stop and boarding of a vessel after dark for safety and registration inspection
without cause to suspect noncompliance," is not justified by the governmental
need to enforce compliance, and thus, violates the Fourth Amendment.94 Because
the ruling was narrowly tailored to fit the facts of the case, specifically that the
boarding was conducted at night, it is difficult to determine what application it
may have for other cases involving searches under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).
Nevertheless, the court does provide some insight into the reasonableness
calculus. The Pinercourt adopts the subjective test, as expounded in Delaware
v. Prouse, to determine the weight of the individual interest involved in the
context of vessel searches upon the high seas. 95 The court determines that the
stop of an isolated boat at night, followed by a physical intrusion, has an
unsettling effect immeasurably greater than the stop of an automobile upon a
public highway by an identifiable police car. For this reason, the court demanded
that the government
produce more significant factors to sway the reasonableness
96
scale in its favor.
The court again emphasized the difference between vessels at sea and
automobiles in UnitedStates v. Aikens 97 in determining the appropriate standard
against which to judge a search intended to discover contraband as opposed to
safety violations. An ongoing undercover investigation of marijuana trafficking
culminated in the boarding of a Panamanian freighter approximately 700 miles
southeast of the Hawaiian Islands.98 The court considered that vehicles are
typically operated along established roads, whereas vessels are operated upon the
open sea; the relative anonymity enjoyed by a sailor compared to that of a driver;
the practical difficulty in requiring the Coast Guard to return to shore in order to
obtain a warrant before searching a ship; and the decreased expectation of
privacy that occupants of both vessels and vehicles enjoy due to the prevalence
of police regulation.99 The court concluded that the distinctions between a land
vehicle and a sea vessel are so nominal that a separate standard for justifying a
search at sea is inappropriate. Thus, as probable cause is required to justify the
search of a vehicle, it should also be required to justify the search of a vessel.' 0
This case illustrates that comparisons to other areas of Fourth Amendment law
have been used to contradict, as well as support, the validity of suspicionless
searches at sea authorized by 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).
The Aikens court considered the greater expectation of privacy held by those
aboard vessels upon the high seas."' In so doing, it relied on United States v.
Cadena, in which the Fifth Circuit examined the privacy expectation and noted
that there is a greater expectation of privacy held by those aboard vessels than by

94. Piner,608 F.2d at 361.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 685 F. Supp. 732, 740 (D. Haw. 1988).
98. Id. at 734-35.
99. Id. at 740.
100. Id. at 741.
101. Id.at 740.
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those driving automobiles. 2 The court focused on the different purposes for
which vehicles and vessels are commonly used, stating that under normal
circumstances, motor vehicles are not designed to be residences, whereas "[t]he
ship is the sailor's home."' 3 The court did acknowledge that the unique
characteristics of a ship at sea make it difficult to impose the traditional warrant
requirement, however, it concluded that the increased measure of privacy
expected by those aboard vessels mandates that such searches be permitted only
upon probable cause.0 4
The Supreme Court has held that a warrantless search of a mobile home, which
might be comparable to a vessel, is constitutional despite its capability of use as
a residence.'0 5 However, the Supreme Court was not willing to eliminate the
probable cause requirement for such a search even though the ready mobility of
the vehicle reduced the expectation of privacy."' Thus, the Supreme Court, in
maintaining the probable cause requirement in a situation with patent similarities
to searches of vessels at sea, provided yet another argument for demanding that
the Coast Guard establish probable cause before searching vessels at sea.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the reasonableness calculus is
vulnerable to manipulation. As most tests articulated by the Supreme Court, it is
fact-sensitive and does not provide a bright-line rule which can be applied with
any appreciable degree of uniformity. The courts have found that the
government's interest on the high seas is heightened by the difficulty in
enforcing safety regulations created by the important factual differences existing
at sea. In contrast, the courts have generally considered the intrusion visited upon
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests to be minimal. However, the
motivations of the Coast Guard in conducting such searches, and the extent of
the search allowed once the boarding has occurred are additional factors
contributing to the unreasonableness of these searches.
C. PretextualBoardings
Courts have generally interpreted 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) as conferring authority
upon the Coast Guard to search for safety and documentation violations.' 7
Because the vast majority of boardings conducted by the Coast Guard are for the
stated purpose of performing administrative safety inspections," 8 the government
has occasionally referred to administrative searches in other contexts to justify
the Coast Guard's searches at sea. 0 9 This is not a novel approach. The

102. 588 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1979).
103. Id. at 101.
104. Id. at 102.
105. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
106. Id. at 392, 394.
107. See cases cited supranote 8.
108. Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the FourthAmendment, and Warrantless
Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REv. 725, 738 (1980).
109. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973).
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government also borrowed heavily from the administrative search cases to
establish the validity of warrantless searches of automobiles."'
In Frank v. Maryland,the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless inspection of
private premises for the purposes of locating and eliminating a public nuisance.'11
The opinion was generally interpreted as creating another "specifically
established and well-delineated" exception to the rule that warrantless searches
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 2 However, the Court abandoned
this interpretation in Camarav. Municipal Court, in which it stated that "such
[administrative] searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant
procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment
guarantees."". 3 The Court did, however, modify the warrant requirement for
certain administrative searches, and held that probable cause justifying the
issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing
violation, but also upon a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular [location]."".4 This modification was expanded in Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States" 5 and United States v. Biswell," 6 which upheld
warrantless administrative searches based on no suspicion of criminal activity
due to pervasive congressional regulation of the liquor and firearms industries.
Thus, warrantless administrative searches absent probable cause have been
approved in some circumstances. The government has cited the administrative
search cases as additional support for the validity of the Coast Guard's searches
under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a). However, there are significant problems with this
comparison.
The general rule is that the Coast Guard may stop and board any American flag
vessel on the high seas" 7 without any particularized suspicion of criminal
activity."' Despite the fact that 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), as written, would empower the
Coast Guard to board any American vessel and fully search it for any reason, the
language has been construed restrictively, allowing such stops for the limited
purpose of conducting safety inspections." 9 Once the Coast Guard has boarded
a vessel, the Coast Guard may conduct a full stem-to-stern search only if
circumstances arise during the safety inspection that generate probable cause that

110. Id. (stating that the cases involving administrative searches upon which the government
relied were not sufficient to support constitutionality of warrantless search of automobile by
roving patrol absent probable cause).
111. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
112. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967).
113. Id. at 534.
114. Id. at 538.
115. 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (sustaining a warrantless inspection without probable cause of a
liquor store because of pervasive regulation by Congress of the industry).
116. 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (expanding the reasoning of Colonnade to encompass firearms
industry).
117. United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1125 n.3 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v.
Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980);
United States v. Hilton, 469 F. Supp. 94, 107 (D. Me. 1979).
118. See cases cited supra note 117.
119. See cases cited supra note 8.
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there is a violation of United States law. 2 ' Two related problems arise in the
context of these administrative searches. The first is that some courts have ruled
that the Coast Guard may board under the guise of a safety inspection, while
intending to search for drugs. The second is that once on board, the scope of the
search is not confined to that which is necessary for a safety inspection.' 2 '
The case law does not definitively determine whether such pretextual searches
are valid under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a). Some courts, primarily those in the Fifth
Circuit, have held that the Coast Guard's power to stop and board American
vessels on the high seas encompasses not only safety and documentation
22
inspections, but also searches for "obvious customs and narcotics violations."'
Moreover, it appears that a stop initiated for the sole purpose of looking for
obvious narcotics violations would be constitutionally permissible according to
the Fifth Circuit. However, this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is the
subject of much controversy even within the Fifth Circuit.
In United States v. Warren, the Coast Guard boarded a shrimping vessel
approximately 700 miles from the United States for the purpose of conducting
a safety and documentation inspection. 123 Upon boarding the vessel, one of the
officers examined the ship's papers which indicated that the vessel was not
bound for a foreign port. A special agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency, who
was one of three comprising the boarding party, then asked if there were any
firearms aboard. A crew member stated that there were, and led the officers to
the crew's quarters to examine the firearms. 24 Subsequently, the officers
performed a "cursory search" of the vessel, which was presumably initiated
pursuant to their authority to conduct such administrative searches and involved
the opening of closets, cabinets, drawers, and personal items of the crew such as
one of the defendant's shaving kits. 25 This case illustrates the anomaly created
when the Coast Guard conducts these safety inspections. Although such searches
might be justified under the relevant administrative search law, the defense

120. United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890, 892 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Erwin, 602 F.2d 1183, 1184 (5th Cir. 1979); Warren, 578 F.2d at 1065; United States v.
Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Crews, 605 F. Supp. 730, 737 (S.D.
Fla. 1985).
121. See OperationStopgap,BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 1978 (Parade Magazine), at 7:
If we suspect a ship of carrying narcotics, and it doesn't stop... [w]aming shots
usually stop them. Then we board, usually with five men in a smaller boat, well
It's a subterfuge. We say we
armed. We say we are operating under the law ....
are running a check for "compliance with U.S. law." Or we say: "We are
authorized under umpty-umpty-ump of the government something," and we
board. If it's empty we do a routine safety inspection ....
Id. (quoting Commander John Streeper, U.S. Coast Guard, Head of General Law Enforcement
Section).
122. United States v. Jonas, 639 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Warren, 578 F.2d
at 1064-65); see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1075-78 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc); United States v. Erwin, 602 F.2d 1183, 1183-84 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980).
123. 578 F.2d at 1061.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1062, 1085.
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becomes tenuous when the inspection entails a search for evidence of criminal
violations as well as safety violations. Although the majority held that the search
was constitutionally permissible, the dissent recognized the serious problem
presented by the court's holding.
The dissenters in Warren would have held that the search and seizure were
unconstitutional.' 26 The dissent noted that in the previous cases before the Fifth
Circuit in which illegal contraband was discovered during a Coast Guard search,
it was found either in plain view or in the course of a genuine safety inspection
which was limited in scope. It then distinguished these cases from Warren by
emphasizing that the Coast Guard in this case was engaged from the outset in an
"affirmative investigation beyond the scope of a safety inspection."' 2 7 Thus, the
search was unconstitutional, not because of its fundamental nature, but due to the
shape the search assumed once the Coast Guard was aboard the vessel.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Fay emphasized that "[t]he moment the
Coast Guard absent probable cause enlarges the scope of its inquiry beyond that
of a safety and documentary inspection, the seizure is no longer
constitutional."'2 8 Thus, Judge Fay and her fellow dissenters in the en banc
decision of the Fifth Circuit would adhere to the rule generally adopted in the
other circuits which would confine the Coast Guard's authority under 14 U.S.C.
§ 89(a) to true administrative searches for safety and documentation purposes.
Despite the vehement arguments of the dissenters in Warren, the Fifth Circuit
reaffirmed its ruling in United States v. Mazyak, in which the Coast Guard
boarded a forty-two foot trawler about seventy miles south of Cuba. 2 9 The
appellant alleged that the boarding was pretextual, and thus, an abuse of the
authority to conduct safety inspections granted by 14 U.S.C. § 89(a). 3 The court
discarded the appellant's argument, and ruled that the case law explicitly
authorizes inspections for "obvious narcotics violations."'' The defendants
argued that the scope of the search exceeded that which is authorized by the
statute, and specifically objected to the search of a sailbag in the engine room in
which the Coast Guard discovered the contraband. However, this complaint fell
on deaf ears. The court ruled that the search was proper, saying that the
contraband found inside the bag was discovered in the course of a normal search
for safety, documentation, and "obvious narcotics violations."' 32 Query how
contraband hidden inside a sailbag in the engine room could have been "obvious"
even under the Fifth Circuit's broad interpretation of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Thompson, departed from the broad
rule propounded by the Fifth Circuit in Warren and Mazyak, but curiously cited
an en banc opinion of the Fifth Circuit in doing so.' The Thompson court noted
that a two-part test was established in Williams, which demanded no suspicion

126. Id. at 1078 (Roney, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1080 (Fay, J., dissenting).
129. 650 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).
130. Id.
131. Id.

132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. 710 F.2d 1500, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984).

1997]

SMOOTH SAILING

of wrongdoing for a safety and documentation inspection, but required
Thus,
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory search of contraband.'
apparently the Fifth Circuit's inconsistencies lead other courts to give its broad
rule a more narrow interpretation.
The Ninth Circuit also considered the effect of a pretextual administrative
boarding in United States v. Watson.'35 The defendants in Watson claimed that
the search was invalid because it was motivated by criminal enforcement
interests. This claim was based on the parties' stipulation that if called, the
commander of the Coast Guard cutter would testify that he was to "board and
inspect all United States vessels less than 200 feet in length." Moreover, the
government conceded that one of the purposes of the administrative plan was to
attempt to interdict the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.' 36 The court
rejected the defendants' claim, reasoning that the stop and search had an
independent administrative justification and did not exceed the permissible scope
of the administrative justification.' Watson is distinguishable from the previous
cases because the scope of the search was apparently confined to that which was
necessary for a safety inspection. It is not clear how the court would have
decided the issue had the search been more intrusive.
Other circuits that have addressed the validity of these pretextual boardings
have generally refrained from outwardly stating that the Coast Guard is
authorized under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) to initiate searches for "obvious narcotics
violations" as did the Fifth Circuit. They have, however, stated that an otherwise
valid search conducted under the auspices of a safety search will not fail under
the Fourth Amendment if motivated by criminal enforcement objectives as well.
The First Circuit declined to invalidate a safety inspection motivated by such
objectives in UnitedStates v. Arra stating that:
Ascertaining the real motivation or suspicions of the officer who orders...
these... inspections would prove intractable. Thus, rather than looking into
the minds of the officers, we will concentrate on their actions. If the search
is limited in scope to checking documentation and checking safety equipment
and conditions, it is valid.'
Similarly, the Third Circuit refused to strike down an otherwise proper safety
inspection merely because it was partly motivated by suspicion of criminal
activity. The court reasoned that as long as contraband is discovered during the
course of an inspection no more intrusive than a proper safety inspection it is
valid. 39 Thus, the courts of different circuits accept to varying degrees
administrative searches upon the high seas even though partly motivated by
suspicion of criminal behavior. While the Fifth Circuit has made it fairly clear
that it will authorize these searches for "obvious narcotics violations" as well as

134. Id. at 1505 (citing United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1086-87 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc)).
135. 678 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1982).
136. Id. at 769.
137. Id. at 771.
138. 630 F.2d 836, 846 (Ist Cir. 1980).
139. See United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910
(1981).
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safety and documentation checks, other more conservative circuits have simply
said that suspicion of criminal activity will not invalidate an otherwise
permissible safety search. However, the problems with these multipurpose
administrative searches remain.
The Supreme Court has carefully limited the freedom of officials conducting
administrative searches in other contexts. Although the Court has relaxed the
probable cause requirement, an administrative warrant was still deemed
necessary to "provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is
reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an
administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria."'4 ° Of significance to the
Court is the discretion held by the officials conducting the searches, and the
likelihood that such discretion will be abused, 4 ' a concern of particular relevance
to searches conducted by the Coast Guard upon the high seas. Coast Guard
officers in the field have complete discretion to determine which vessels to stop,
and how frequently to board a particular vessel. Occasionally, officers will claim
to be acting under an "administrative plan" which confines their discretion.'42
However, these administrative plans usually consist of a directive to board all
vessels under anywhere from 200 to 600 feet in length. Considering the limited
resources available to the Coast Guard, it is difficult to fathom that a Coast
Guard cutter is able to stop and board virtually every pleasure and commercial
vessel it meets, excluding only large freighters and barges. Assuming this is true,
logic suggests that the Coast Guard is left with discretion to determine which of
the vessels fitting the length description to board. Furthermore, it seems unlikely
that a court would find a random roving automobile search more palatable simply
because law enforcement officers are acting under an "administrative plan" to
stop all Cadillacs. Presumably, an acceptable administrative plan containing
"specific neutral criteria" requires more than a length designation.
That the administrative searches conducted by the Coast Guard are often
pretextual presents another impediment to the constitutionality of 14 U.S.C. §
89(a). The law requires definition in this area, and questions need answering.
Does the statute authorize the Coast Guard to initiate searches for safety and
documentation inspections only, or does it, as the Fifth Circuit would claim,
permit searches for "obvious narcotics violations" as well? Once on board, to
what extent may the Coast Guard search to discover such violations? This area
of the law is in dire need of resolution by the Supreme Court.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)
The government certainly has a vital interest in ensuring that vessels on the
high seas are safe, seaworthy, and properly documented. However, this interest

140. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
141. See, e.g., id.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1502 (11th Cir. 1983) (involving
Coast Guard cutter acting under administrative plan to board every American vessel under 400
feet in length); United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765, 769 (9th Cir.) (involving Coast Guard
acting pursuant to administrative plan to board all vessels less than 200 feet in length), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
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should not be advanced at the cost of sacrificing the constitutional freedoms of
law-abiding seafarers. There are several avenues which, if pursued, would bring
the statute within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. One of the
justifications for allowing suspicionless searches on the high seas is that many
violations of the safety and documentation regulations are not readily observable
from the exterior of a vessel. However, this could be remedied by developing a
better system for safety and documentation. Currently, there are no licensing
requirements for much of the traffic on the seas. One need not obtain a "driver's
license" prior to setting sail; nor does one have to go through training before
heading out to sea. Unlike driver's education, which is a prerequisite to driving
an automobile in many states, there is no course one must take to operate a
vessel. Perhaps if a uniform system of licensing were implemented, those on the
high seas would not only be more qualified to safely operate their vessels, but
they would be better educated about the laws by which they must abide.
This licensing program would also include a feature comparable to "license
plates" found on automobiles. Only by qualifying for a license would one be
eligible to register a vessel. If an individual is properly licensed, he may register
his vessel through the -normal means. By following this process, the
owner/operator of the vessel would receive the equivalent of a "license plate"
which is to remain affixed to the exterior of his vessel in a uniform location at
all times.
Individuals would also be required to renew their registration annually. In
order to receive this annual registration renewal, the vessel would undergo an
extensive safety inspection. During this annual safety inspection, which would
be conducted dockside, the Coast Guard would board the vessel to locate and
examine all safety equipment, the main beam number, the engine, all storage
compartments typically used to maintain safety equipment, and bilges. This
annual inspection would also give the Coast Guard an opportunity to ensure that
the name and hailing port are properly marked on the vessel. An additional
provision would require a minimum amount of insurance on every vessel. The
availability of such insurance would be affected by an extremely poor safety
record, convictions relating to drug trafficking, and noncompliance with
registration regulations. Finally, compliance with safety regulations would be
required when not in operation, as well as when underway. These additions to the
current regulations would increase safety while maintaining the individual's
Fourth Amendment privacy interests. By establishing a uniform system of
registration and annual safety inspections, individuals will have some notice of
the Coast Guard's boarding. This would eliminate the subjective intrusion, or
degree of fright, generated by the boarding process, yet maintain the Coast
Guard's right to conduct a fairly extensive search.
The licensing, registration, and insurance requirements could be implemented
at a nominal cost. The annual dockside safety inspection would involve
considerable expense and man-hours. However, the Coast Guard is currently
authorized to conduct random dockside inspections under 14 U.S.C. § 89. By
implementing the annual inspection program, the necessity of the random
searches at sea would be significantly reduced. Thus, a considerable portion of
the resources allotted to such random searches could be reallocated to support the
annual inspection program.
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In addition to the above modifications, individuals would still be required to
submit to warrantless dockside inspections, based upon no probable cause. As
an administrative search, the officers' discretion would be limited by "specific
neutral criteria" enumerated in detailed guidelines governing such searches. The
administrative plan would specify the reasonable times during which the searches
may be conducted, excluding evening hours. The plan would also include a
checklist of safety equipment to be located and examined. The scope of the
administrative search, which would not be directed to criminal enforcement,
would be limited to that which is truly necessary to accomplish the items set forth
in the checklist. Clear guidelines would indicate which areas may not be
searched. Any evidence obtained in violation of these guidelines would be
deemed inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
The discretion of the officers conducting these dockside inspections would be
further confined by limiting the frequency of these searches. Upon completion
of a random dockside search, the officers would leave the vessel owners with a
form demonstrating that a search has been performed and documenting
compliance. If Coast Guard officers are presented with such forms upon
initiating a dockside inspection, and the forms indicate that an inspection has
been conducted within the past three months, the Coast Guard would refrain from
engaging in further examination of the vessel. This would allow the Coast Guard
to inspect any one vessel up to four times annually in addition to the mandatory
annual safety inspection in concert with registration. Furthermore, because
compliance with safety laws would be required regardless of whether the vessel
is in operation, and a vessel may be subject to a random dockside inspection,
individuals will be discouraged from removing safety equipment from the vessel.
As a corollary to the dockside inspections, the Coast Guard would be permitted
to stop and board vessels at certain permanent, or at least well-established,
checkpoints. Due to the vast open seas, this alternative would only be useful in
certain high traffic areas, such as common paths of commerce, or waterways
leading into the open seas. The unique circumstances existing at sea make this
alternative less attractive than those previously mentioned. However, if used in
concert with the other enumerated modifications, checkpoint stops would provide
some benefit to the Coast Guard.
A final modification on the interpretation of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) would focus on
the imposition of some "quantum of individualized suspicion." Reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity would be a prerequisite to all boardings. Only if
this suspicion developed into probable cause once aboard would a full search be
permitted. The necessity of these searches at sea would be mitigated if the
licensing and registration program were enacted, the dockside and checkpoint
inspections initiated, and compliance with safety regulations required at all
times. Moreover, the licensing program would diminish the strength of the
government's claim that violations of safety laws are often unobservable. The
Coast Guard would retain its authority to search for "obvious narcotics
violations," as well as safety violations, as long as they had developed probable
cause after boarding the vessel upon reasonable suspicion to suspect such
activity. The same factors which have previously established reasonable
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suspicion would still suffice, such as a vessel riding extraordinarily low in the
water, noncompliance with navigation rules, and failure to maintain equipment.'
Although boaters and the Coast Guard will undoubtedly maintain some of their
respective complaints should the above modifications be implemented, both must
accept the obligations that accompany rights and freedoms. Boaters would be
subject to the same requirements that currently exist, with the additional
licensing and registration demands, which are hardly a costly sacrifice for
additional freedoms. The Coast Guard, on the other hand, would be permitted to
continue all of its current practices subject to restrictions on the scope of their
searches and the requirement that searches at sea be preceded by probable cause.
CONCLUSION

The courts which have addressed this issue have reluctantly applied the Fourth
Amendment, or some aberration thereof, to determine that the Coast Guard's
suspicionless searches of vessels on the high seas are permissible. The result is
that the Coast Guard apparently has the authority to stop and board a vessel on
the open sea, interrogate the crew, and search every compartment of the ship
including its crew's cabins. If probable cause is found during this initial
"cursory" s9fety search, the Coast Guard may pull up carpet, drill holes in the
ship, and remove floorboards in search of contraband.
Courts which have applied the Fourth Amendment reasonableness calculus
have usually found that the governmental interest outweighs the privacy interests
of the individual. In doing so, some courts have considered the difficulty of drug
interdiction at sea. This is an inappropriate focus. The courts should confine their
analysis to the government's purported purpose of enforcing safety laws.
Pretextual boardings should be disallowed, and searches for contraband should
be preceded by a showing of at least reasonable suspicion of such criminal
activity. Securing compliance with safety laws is certainly an important
objective, and the unique character of travel upon the seas creates novel
impediments in the fulfillment of this goal. However, the Supreme Court pointed
out that "[t]he needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the
Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official
power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute
loyalty to constitutional safeguards."' 44 Even the impossibility of enforcement
could not justify .unconstitutional practices, for "to procure an eminent good by
means that are unlawful, is as little consonant to private morality as to public
justice."'' 45 Furthermore, the Court has rejected a similar system of spot checks
for automobiles. In doing so, it reasoned that the "marginal contribution" of such
checks was outweighed by the "grave danger" of abuse of discretion and the
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intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests.'46 The Court in Prouse determined
that the government's interest was not sufficient in light of the alternative
mechanisms available to justify the intrusion upon constitutional guarantees.' 47
The relevance of this decision to the Coast Guard's searches is patent.
There are available less intrusive alternatives which would bring the Coast
Guard's searches within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. By
implementing some or all of the modifications previously discussed herein, the
Coast Guard would retain broad authority to search vessels. Vessels would be
searched with more uniformity, and perhaps with more frequency. As with other
permissible searches, some "quantum of individualized suspicion" must be
required before the Coast Guard can stop and board a vessel upon the high seas.
This reasonable suspicion requirement would be the only additional impediment
to the Coast Guard's boarding authority as it currently exists. The administrative
plans under which the Coast Guard is acting must set forth specific neutral
criteria which clearly delineate the appropriate areas to be searched. These
guidelines should be published and circulated to those registering vessels, so that
individuals traveling upon the high seas recognize and comprehend the
boundaries of the Coast Guard's authority.
The inconsistencies and ambiguities in this area of the law require resolution.
Until less intrusive alternatives are implemented through legislative action, the
courts must ensure that the guaraptees of the Fourth Amendment are not
assaulted, for the "shield
against unreasonable searches does not rust on
48
exposure to salt air."'
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